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In this article we analyse the problem of emergence in its diachronic 
dimension. In other words, we intend to deal with the generation of 
novelties in natural processes.  Our approach aims at integrating some 
insights coming from Whitehead’s Philosophy of the Process with the 
epistemological framework developed by the “autopoietic” tradition. 
Our thesis is that the emergence of new entities and rules of interaction 
(new “fields of relatedness”) requires the development of discontinuous 
models of change. From this standpoint natural evolution can be 
conceived as a succession of emergences — each one realizing a novel 
“extended” present, described by distinct models — rather than as a 
single and continuous dynamics. This theoretical and epistemological 
framework is particularly suitable to the investigation of the origin of 
life, an emblematic example of this kind of processes.  
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“Order is not sufficient. What is required is something much more complex. It is 
order entering upon novelty; so that the massiveness of order does not 
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degenerate into mere repetition; and so that the novelty is always reflected upon 
a background of system.” (A. N. Whitehead) 
1. Introduction: Emergence from Identity to Process 
One of the wider and more radical controversies that characterize 
contemporary thought — which however has a long tradition in the 
modern age and even before in the ancient one — opposes some views 
which consider a material or energetic foundation as primary in the 
natural world — whereby the processes of evolution and development 
would have only a derivative or even epiphenomenic status  — and some 
other views which, on the contrary, consider the dimension of 
development and creativity as primary and fundamental.1 The first kind 
of approaches leads to a reductionist practice, inclined to trace the 
complex forms of organization back to the properties of single and 
disconnected elements.2,3 The second identifies a continuous creative 
process in which systems of great complexity emerge4 as an ubiquitous 
feature of our universe. This controversy concerns the implicit theoretical 
and epistemological basic assumptions about the generative potential of 
the world: the idea of a creative nature able to give rise to qualitatively 
new forms is thus opposed to a view of natural world as a mere 
rearrangement of elements already and forever defined and fixed. 
The idea of emergence plays a crucial role for every approach that 
stresses the inherent creativity of the universe.  Emergence, however, is a 
wide concept: a label under which many phenomena, models, descriptive 
relations can be collected. It can express: part-whole relations; different 
kinds of descriptive limits; the constitution of systems from basic 
components; the expression of new behaviors and properties; creative 
historical processes etc. 
In The Structure of Science5 Nagel introduces the topic of emergence 
by criticizing the generic use of the expression “emergent evolution”. He 
asserts that it confuses two different concepts that would need to be 
carefully distinguished: the first is a thesis on hierarchical organizations, 
specifically on the predictability or not of higher level properties in terms 
of lower level ones; the second one is a cornerstone of a evolutionary 
cosmology, a thesis concerning the “creative advance of nature” which 
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would give rise to novel entities or properties. The latter version of 
emergence, according to him, is not entailed by the former. Other 
authors, instead, propose weaker distinctions.6  
Any attempt to develop an emergentist approach to the problem of 
change needs to take into consideration this issue. According to us, there 
is no need to establish a-priori a strong distinction between the two 
versions of the concept: focusing on either synchronic (hierarchical) or 
diachronic (processual) aspects, however, can be useful and even 
necessary for specific descriptive purposes. In our view the concept of 
emergence concerns, in a very broad sense, the appearing of qualitative 
novelties in the natural world, and it entails a specific thesis in the 
characterization of this novelty: the un-deducibility of the new features 
of the world — a higher level entity as well as new behaviors or 
properties — from an initial and predetermined model, which can consist 
in the description of the basic component as well as the description of the 
initial state in a historical dynamics. From this point of view, the two 
meanings of emergence strongly separated by Nagel should be revalued 
as two dimensions of the same issue, concerning the limits in our 
capabilities, as scientific observers, of interacting with complex natural 
phenomena: the insufficiency of a single modality of description and the 
necessity to recur to multiple irreducible ones, as an inescapable aspects 
of our relationship with the world7,8,9. The sub-classifications, thus, 
should be always functional to the main focus of the investigation, 
whether it is directed to the definition of the identity of a system or to the 
characterization of a historical process. What shouldn’t be ignored, as we 
will show in the following sections, is that hierarchical and processual 
aspects are strictly intertwined. 
According to these remarks is it possible to re-formulate the 
distinction between synchronic and diachronic emergence as two 
perspectives on the same issue: 
 Synchronic emergence concerns the recognition by the observer of a 
unitary system, the characterization of its identity as not deducible 
from its components, and the identification of different levels of 
analysis. The focus of the investigation is mainly the relation 
between pars and whole. An example is the model of a living system. 
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 Diachronic emergence concerns the processes that give rise to new 
entities, properties and behaviors in the natural world, not deducible 
from the initial ones. The level of description is that of the 
interaction between systems and their environments. Examples are 
the models of the origin of life and of the processes of speciation. 
In previous articles10,11 the synchronic perspective has been developed, 
while the purpose here is to analyse what idea of process is entailed by 
the definition of emergence given above. Our analysis is theoretical and 
epistemological, rather than metaphysical. It is placed at the level of the 
interface between the observer and the natural world. Consequently it is 
focused on the modalities of access to reality and on the conceptual 
models of change that derive from the dialogical interaction between 
subject and object.12,13,9,14  
2. Modes of Change 
The basic idea of diachronic emergence consists in the impossibility to 
deduce the future steps of a process from even the most accurate 
description of the present and past ones. In order to understand the 
implications of this descriptive limit, it is necessary to start by 
considering what can change in the description of a temporal dynamics, 
and then pointing out the differences between a reductionist approach 
and an emergentist one. With respect to these aspects, the notion of 
logical openness15,16,17 can play a useful role in expressing how the 
possibilities of modeling a system change according the complexity of its 
internal dynamics and of its interactions with the environment. To the 
increase in the degree of logical openness of a system corresponds its 
higher ability to express different dynamics and behaviors from those 
predicted by individual models.  
The simplest form of change is the succession of states, which 
exhibits the form of an input-output relation: given some rules of 
transformation, boundary conditions, and some initial value (input) of the 
variable under study, after a certain amount of time the variable will 
assume a new value (output). This form of dynamics, of course, does not 
produce any effective novelty: everything is already implicitly given at 
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the beginning. According to the framework proposed by the theory of 
logical openness,15,16,17 it corresponds to a level of openness zero. 
In order to observe some effective change taking place in the 
dynamics it is necessary to focus not just on states, but on those factors 
— or “informational levels” 18 — of our descriptive models of a system 
and of system/environment interactions, which contribute to define the 
dynamics itself: 
(i) The rules of interaction; 
(ii) The boundary conditions; 
(iii) The parameters of the system. 
The difference between a model of a process that admits effective 
novelty and one which does not, lies in the capability or not to define and 
modify these three factors18,9. It is sufficient to think of the radical 
difference between an object sliding along an inclined plane and the 
internal environment generated by a living system. In the first case the 
rules of interaction are fixed as well as the properties of the object, and 
the boundary conditions are external and not influenced by the dynamics: 
all the three aspects are extrinsic to each other and not modified by the 
process they take part into. As we said above, in this case the logical 
openness of the model of the system under study is zero, as the system 
does not behave in a different way from that described by the initial 
model. 
Things are different when these informational levels are not strictly 
separated, but in mutual interaction in such a way that the levels of 
logical openness increase. In the second case — concerning the internal 
environment of an organism — in fact, the internal environment is self-
realized and self-maintained, and in certain degrees can be changed. The 
constitution of a living system separated from its surrounding 
environment, establishes a new internal context, so introducing — at 
least some — new boundary conditions for its internal dynamics 
(metabolism). The metabolism produces new kinds of components that 
behave in different ways, with the result of defining new rules of 
interaction that, in turn, can change some of the properties of the internal 
context,9,19,20,12,18,8. In this case the three informational levels are not 
extrinsic to each other and independent, but are co-defined and, as a 
consequence, their change requires the elaboration of new models. In 
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other words, the action of a system on its own definitory constraints — 
specifying its internal dynamics as well as its modalities of interaction 
with the environment — increase its logical openness, so establishing 
limits in principle in the possibility of modeling it. 
This modality of change can take place only under specific conditions 
at the level of the basic theoretical assumptions, conditions that are not 
satisfied in a typical mechanistic or reductionist framework. The latter is 
based, in fact, on the theses that (a) all the entities involved in a 
dynamics can be exhaustively characterized by their intrinsic properties; 
(b) that the environment is fixed and cannot be influenced by the objects 
that interact in it; and (c) that the rules that describe these interactions are 
external — that is — the interactions do not change the properties of the 
entities that interact and, vice versa, the modalities of interaction are not 
modified by these same objects.9 As Whitehead — among the others —
pointed out21,22,23,24, this is not necessarily a characteristic of reality in 
itself. Rather, it is just a possible perspective, which consist in the result 
of a procedure of theoretical construction, that in the reductionist 
framework, however, is assumed as an ontological foundation (the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness): an abstraction from the integrated 
unity of the natural world (mechanism of extensive abstraction) that leads 
to define objects in themselves without reference to nothing else 
(principle of simple localization of matter). The starting point of the 
reductionist approach is, thus, the definition of what is “fundamental”: 
self-sufficient entities with extrinsic interactions. Then, this basic 
framework is extended to the all the levels of the natural world. The 
result is that everything is already given at this fundamental (self-
sufficient) level and all changes in the synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions are consequently epiphenomenic.25 
The independency of informational levels and entities, on the one 
hand, can be useful in the modeling or control of simple systems. Here 
the form of change “input then output” or “δA then δB” implies that 
what changes in one factor of the description does not influence the 
others, or that the interaction between elements does not change or define 
some of their properties. On the other hand it fails (a) in describing the 
dynamics of integrated and transformative — or better, complex7,18,8— 
systems like living ones and (b) in accounting for effective processes 
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able to generate any kind of novelty in the natural world, beside a mere 
rearrangement of elements. 
3. Systemic Hierarchies 
From the theoretical point of view the mechanistic framework has, as a 
result, the construction of inclusive hierarchies of sets, like Simon’s 
modules26 or Jacob’s intregrones27. They consist in “Chinese-box” 
constructions that share three main properties. (i) The first is that, when a 
certain domain of investigation is approached, in principle it is always 
possible to find an “ultimate” or basic model pertaining what is 
considered in this case as the fundamental level. All the information 
necessary in order to describe the system is in principle already present at 
this lower level. Also, the entities that are relevant in it are the result of a 
specific operation. They are, in fact, characterized as the material, or 
structural parts10,11 through their intrinsic properties — that is — those 
properties that are independent of their relational context: describing 
them in isolation or in interaction does not make any difference. Then the 
higher hierarchical level under investigation can be conceptually built 
from these basic bricks. (ii) From this follows the second property. It 
consists in the possibility to fractionate the higher level entities without 
loss of information. The main reason is that the elements are defined 
without reference to anything else, and the interactions that give rise to 
bigger aggregates are not transformative of their properties. (iii) The 
third consists in the possibility to ascribe some form of functional 
autonomy to higher order entities. Nonetheless it is just a useful heuristic 
operation that allows to abstract from some descriptive steps. It does not 
exclude that everything necessary for the description of the phenomenon 
under study is in principle already present at the fundamental level: 
higher ones are ultimately epiphenomenic and derivable from it. 
The most celebrated example of this foundational and reductionist 
perspective is the concept of physicalism3,28, which claims that in the 
world there is nothing but the “physical”, meaning with that the “basic 
physics”, whatever it could be. Yet, the idea of basic self-sufficient 
entities or particles has been deeply questioned in microphysics,25,29,30 the 
same domain to which the status of fundamental is ascribed by 
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reductionist approaches. The main criticism consists in pointing out how 
different theoretical operations can lead to the characterization of entities 
with different characteristics. On the basis this argument, a different 
interpretation of the notion of particle has been proposed: from the basic 
brick of reality to a theoretical construct useful as a heuristic tool.30 
In order to account for the creativity of nature and the properties of 
complex systems a different path is to be followed. The alternative 
consists in abandoning the idea of a fundamental level of description, and 
in focusing on the modalities of access to the natural world25,11. It means 
rejecting the theoretical procedure that starts from the bottom of a 
hierarchy, ascribes to it an ontological primary status, and then builds all 
the others levels from it. The main specificity of this approach consists, 
rather, in taking into consideration another possible observational 
operation besides the identification of the only material parts of a system. 
Depending on the descriptive purposes of the observer and the properties 
of the chosen domain of investigation, this operation is the distinction of 
those entities which are relevant on that domain, a distinction that is 
made with respect to the context these entities realize and that at the 
same time makes them possible. They are the “functional components” 
of the object of study, which are characterized through their relational 
properties11 and require what can be labeled as a mesoscopic approach to 
function. They constitute meta-structures31 that need to be characterized 
top-down and that give rise to a distinct domain of description with 
respect to the one established by the aggregation of material parts. As 
such, they can require different modalities of description with respect to 
structural components (e.g. relational models8). 
The result of this approach is that at any descriptive level the 
pertinent entities and their context are co-defined, co-specified and co-
constructed. In such a framework there is not a primary level but all are 
related to the operations of the observer: they are transcendental rather 
than ontological25. Therefore, it is possible to conceive some novelty in 
the higher levels. They can be considered — using an expression coined 
by Lloyd Morgan32 — as new fields of relatedness, in which terms and 
relations co-emerge and are co-dependent. 
The hypothesis of integrative systemic hierarchies has an important 
tradition. Examples can be found in Feibleman’s Theory of Integrative 
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Levels33, Anokhin’s Theory of Functional Systems34,35 and in more recent 
formulations like Baas’ Hyperstructures36. All share the idea of 
intertwined levels, where the relation between bottom-up (starting from 
basic level) and top-down (starting from higher level) description is not 
trivial — that is — it is not easy to establish a strict correspondence 
between structural (anatomic or material parts) components and 
functional ones. 
As we pointed out elsewhere,9,10,11 in Rosen’s idea of a non-
correspondence between structure and function, and between synthesis 
and analysis,8 lies a possible interpretation of emergence as 
undeducibility. In fact, if higher levels are emergent and, thus, not 
deducible from lower ones, the description of the basic components (the 
material parts) is not sufficient in order to model them. Consequently, in 
order to describe the higher level dynamics, new components — 
functional ones — need to be identified in the emergent relational 
domain. And, under the undeducibility condition, these new functional 
components and the material ones realize two different meta-structures 
whose models do not coincide. 
From a diachronic point of view the consequences of this hierarchical 
emergent framework are twofold. (a) The first is that the levels are 
strictly co-dependent in both directions, bottom-up and top-down, not 
just in the first one: there is no reason to consider any relevant change as 
taking place effectively only at the basic level. Thus, by observing a 
dynamics on a meta-level of description which takes into consideration 
more levels at the same time, it is possible to identify correspondences 
— mutual specifications — between changes at different levels or 
descriptive domains.9 Similarly — in Bitbol’s “interventionist-
constitutive view”29 — we can conceive that an intervention that operates 
some changes on one level can trigger modifications at other levels.  
(b) The second consequence is the aspect of novelty brought forth by 
diachronic emergence. The emergence of an integrative level, in the form 
of a new systemic unity, establishes a novel dynamics: new boundary 
conditions, new rules of interactions (relations) and new elements — that 
is — new functional components that allow its modeling. It is the 
previous example of the separation between the internal and external 
environment brought forth by the emergence of the living. But the 
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novelty does not concern only the underlining dynamics of an integrated 
unity. In fact, a new entity introduces new relational properties at the 
higher level of its interaction with the environment and, for this reason, it 
contributes to the modification of this more comprehensive dynamics. 
An example can be the emergence of life and its influence on the early 
earth environment; another the birth of a new species that gives rise to a 
new “functional component”, a new niche, in the dynamics of the more 
comprehensive ecological system, so redefining its field of relatedness. 
In these cases new structural and functional meta-structures establish 
new levels of interaction that generate new system/environment 
constraints and, in doing so, new levels of logical openness. 
4. A Model of Diachronic Emergence as a Succession of Fields of 
Relatedness 
From the theoretical and epistemological point of view, the concept of 
emergent systemic hierarchies with functional components expresses an 
idea that is similar in some aspects to that introduced by Whitehead in 
metaphysics through the concept of concrescence22: a web in which 
every element influences and is influenced by the others in the very 
definitory properties. This idea implies that the engine of the generation 
of novelty is the appearing of new elements: an entity that emerges 
synchronically modifies its context. 
It is on this aspect of “novelty that contributes to novelty” at different 
levels of description, that depends the kind of undeducibility that 
specifically characterizes diachronic emergence. In fact, if elements, 
dynamics and context are co-defined at any level or descriptive domain 
and are not built starting from a fundamental level, then any change in 
one of the three factors of this domain triggers a reorganization of it: new 
functional components and new dynamics. Therefore, the new behavior 
of the domain under investigation is no more deducible from the rules 
which were pertinent before the reorganization. 
This form of change constitutes a challenge to our capability of 
modeling, as it imposes strong limitations in the possibility of derivation 
of new processual steps from the previous ones.19 As Kauffman asserts, 
in fact, the novel laws that emerge in the historical process are similar to 
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the introduction of new axioms and — we say — new rules of 
transformation, from which new consequences can be derived20. 
Then, what view of change is entailed by this framework? In the first 
place it introduces a strong version of novelty that is not to be considered 
just as something that was not there before. It is grounded, instead, on the 
condition of diachronic un-deducibility. In the second place, from the 
point of view of our descriptions it has consequences that are similar to 
those of synchronic emergence, but on the horizontal dimension. In fact, 
if a behavior, a property or a dynamics cannot be derived from its 
antecedent, but requires the formulation of new models, we are facing 
some sort of diachronic fragmentation in the domain under investigation. 
In such a perspective the whole process can be considered as a 
succession of relational emergent discontinuities9. 
We are used to some sort of discontinuity in the synchronic 
dimension between the physical, biological, cognitive and social domains 
especially in the debate about emergence. Yet the importance of 
discontinuity has been acknowledged also in natural processes, both in 
cosmology and in evolutionary theory.37,38,39,40,20,4 From the point of view 
of emergence as undeducibility, discontinuity needs to be interpreted not 
just as a difference in the rhythms of transformation, opposed to a 
gradualist view, but as a consequence of the generation of new entities 
and levels of organization which play an effective role in re-defining the 
dynamics in which they are involved. Therefore, we characterize it not as 
a problem in the time scales of our models, but as a form of 
“fragmentation” of the domain of their temporal validity. 
What emerges at every creative step of a natural process is, therefore, 
a “novel present”, with a new field of relatedness that requires specific 
models in order to be described. This implication is particularly evident 
in the biological domain, as Maturana and Mpodozis assert: “the living 
system does not encounter a preexisting niche because it appears with its 
living, and it does not see or relate to a preexisting medium because it 
does not encounter the medium beyond that which appears in the 
realization of its niche. [...] Both in the ontogeny and the phylogeny of 
living systems, living system and niche change together, and [...] indeed, 
living system and medium change together in a continuous becoming of 
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the biosphere as an interconnected network of living and not living 
systems that operationally arises at every instant as a novel present”.41  
This novel present can be described as “extended” or “epochal”. By 
this we mean that certain duration can be ascribed to it. This duration is 
not constant for any epochal present and its extent can be defined on the 
basis of the validity of our models or — in other words — on the basis of 
the interval of invariance of the informational levels that characterize 
them and their degree of logical openness.  
What a novel present is depends on the characteristic of the domain 
of investigation and on the hierarchical level observed. Furthermore, we 
can assert that also the relation between continuity and change is 
dependent on the position of the observer. If we confine ourselves in a 
single epochal present — the domain of permanence of a specific field of 
relatedness — the temporal dynamics appears to us as not creative. If we 
place ourselves on a higher logical level where we take into 
consideration a process that contains more than one “epoch”, change 
appears both creative and discontinuous, and shows the form of a 
succession of novel presents or fields of relatedness. From this 
standpoint is also possible to distinguish three forms of time: (i) as a 
succession of states in a single epochal present; (ii) as the duration of an 
epoch; and (iii) as a transformative discontinuous temporality that 
comprehends successive epochs. 
5. Conclusive Overview with Remarks on the Origins of Life 
The analysis of the concept of emergence in its unity — not just in its 
synchronic dimension — shows the limitations of our possibilities to 
describe the natural world, limitations that can concern the validity of our 
models both from the hierarchical and temporal points of view: two 
strictly co-dependent dimensions. 
The thesis we sustained here is that the attempt to account in our 
conceptual models for the creativity of natural world, necessitates the 
assumption of a processual framework based on the notion of emergence, 
whose property consists in discontinuity. The concept of time it involves 
is not coherent with all the philosophical views on the creativity of 
nature. For example, in Bergson’s thought42 the temporal dynamics is a 
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unitary duration that grows thorough every moment by keeping its past. 
The evolutive dynamics deriving from the framework of diachronic 
emergence, instead, does not exhibit a unitary transformative 
temporality. Rather, at any temporal step it generates a new relational 
field that changes the identity of the process and, consequently, generates 
a discontinuity. Consequently, with regards to these aspects, this 
approach can be considered philosophically closer to Whitehead’s idea 
of process as atomic and discontinuous. In fact it entails in any emergent 
step the generation of something new that revolutionizes the whole 
dynamics. 
What is, then, the relationship between the epochal present and its 
past and future? The novel present is dependent on its past, from which it 
emerges. The past, in fact, is integrated in the new field of relatedness in 
the form of the constraints inherited by its previous steps. Examples are 
the chirality of biological macromolecules and the idea of “frozen 
accident” in evolution. Nonetheless, due to the nondeducibility 
condition, the derivative steps from present to past are precluded as well 
as those towards its future. In such a perspective, any temporal step 
cannot be considered as part of a linear chain, but rather like a node 
whose constitution reorganizes its past and future as horizons of 
possibilities. It provides constraints for the construction of possible past 
and future dynamics. 
The domain of studies on the origins of life constitutes the 
emblematic example of the attempt to reconstruct the lost steps of a 
historical process. The idea of process we analyzed here, based on 
discontinuity and change of rules, has important consequences for the 
investigation in this field. In fact it collides with the principle of 
“continuity.” This is the descendant of Lyell’s principle of actualism in 
geology, one of the theoretical pillars of evolutionary gradualism, which 
asserts the need to explain the past by causes now in operation and, 
consequently, it excludes the investigation of possible different forces in 
act in different times. In some contemporary approaches to the issue of 
the origins of life, assuming its validity is considered as the only 
possibility to test scientifically our hypotheses on early evolution.43 Yet, 
this principle is not universally shared and has already been challenged 
both in geology and in biological evolution.39,40 
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The idea of emergent processes, on the other side, entails the radical 
thesis according to which at any step in pre-biotic evolution there could 
have been a takeover by new forms of proto-life, replacing older ones 
and thus generating new contexts — new relational fields — by 
cancelling the previous ones. That such a takeover could have happened 
is even more probable if those processes were taking place in very small 
environments.  
Surely, therefore, it is difficult to conceive the possibility of 
investigating the past if we cannot totally rely on the knowledge of the 
present. Maybe, it is still possible to think about tracing some of the 
characteristics of LUCA, which constitutes the first step of life as we 
know it. But the three of life is quite deeper and more complex. The 
image of a regular tree can be even misleading in this case, as it hides the 
possibility of takeovers. In fact, for this reason it is spreading as an 
alternative the use of the metaphor of the palm-tree of life, of which 
LUCA constitutes only the last segment, from which all present life 
evolved.  
The idea of discontinuity seems to preclude the possibility of a 
scientific investigation of the previous segments of the trunk of the palm-
tree of life, cancelled by the succession of emergent steps and conserved 
only in the form of constraints. Nevertheless this conclusion is not totally 
true. A possible pathway of investigation is brought forth by some 
studies, like those in astrobiology and especially a part of synthetic 
biology, which attempt to create today new forms of pre-biotic 
evolution44,45 without necessarily claiming that they are the true 
antecedents of contemporary life. What these researches do is, rather, to 
explore some of the possible pre-biological or early biological worlds 
which, by analogy, can provide useful information about a subset of the 
constraints that early evolution had to satisfy. As such, they do allow the 
formulation of some hypothetical scenarios about the history of life on 
earth. At the same time, they open new pathways for future evolution as 
well. 
In conclusion, this framework entails a view of science that is 
alternative to the calculus of a linear chain of events, to the description of 
an algorithmic process from premises to consequences. It is in contrast 
with what Chaitin calls the “Software view of Science”46 — that is — a 
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scientific theory considered as a program that elaborates predictions 
about a world in which all the relevant information is already given as a 
input, and in which the activity of the scientist consists in identifying the 
right algorithm to describe it: a world and a science without emergences. 
Complex systems, by exhibiting logical openness, seem to escape this 
framework by putting into evidence the intrinsic limitations of our 
descriptive tools. As a consequence, in order to be approached they 
require a shift of attention from the refinement or the extension of a 
single model to the meta-domain of relations between different, and 
often complementary, models which work in the traditional way just 
inside their limited domain of validity.15,17 This means not just to choose 
which individual model is more appropriate in order to address a specific 
issue, but also to implement a “dynamical usage of models”47,16, that is, 
to take into consideration the interaction between more than one 
descriptive modality at the same time. A basic example can be found in 
the hybridization of bottom-up and top-down strategies in approaching 
the problem of protein folding. 
This conceptual shift requires an anti-foundational perspective, where 
there is neither a primitive level of description nor constancy of laws to 
appeal to, but just an activity of investigation of natural phenomena 
through the construction of models that are limited in time and in the 
domain of application. This activity consists in the exploration of 
different temporal domains and possible worlds, of manifold hierarchical 
and logical levels, which are distinct but at the same time in a relation of 
mutual specification — through reciprocal selection and constraining — 
and, as such, all necessary for the comprehension of the phenomena 
under study. 
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